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INCONTESTABLE CLAUSE   221

 

pute, except dispute of the fact that premiums had been duly paid. * * *

The suicide provision is clear and explicit. Its plain meaning is that the policy does not become operative as against suicide until two years have elapsed from date of issue, and in the event of suicide at any time within that period, the company's liability is limited to the amount of premium it has received. Insurance is a business affected with a public interest. Viewed from the stand-point of public interest and public policy, the provision is sound in law, morals, and insurance economy. It was entitled to a place in the contract, was inserted in the contract, and it must not be read out of the contract unless its effect is nullified by some provision of greater potency with which it can not be reconciled.

What the company was trying to guard against was insurance taken out by a person who intended to resort to suicide as a means of recouping or swelling his estate, or of providing for or enriching some beneficiary or beneficiaries. Experience shows that this is done often enough to warrant declination of the risk. Such being the purpose of the suicide provision, there is no necessary conflict between it and the incontestable provision. In strictness they re-late to different subjects. One relates to engaging quality of the contract, and the other to definition of risk. Observing the distinction, at the end of a year the company was bound to the full extent of the risk it assumed, but it was not liable on a risk which it stipulated, it would not assume, and the defense that the assured committed suicide no more contested the policy than a defense that he is still alive. * * *

If it be suggested the word "incontestable" has been considered from a lawyer's and not from a layman's standpoint, let it be con-ceded the company is contesting the policy. In that event the policy contains two time limitations with respect to contest. One is general. The other relates to a specific subject, and so constitutes an exception to the general provision. The incontestable provision did not cover the entire subject dealt with by the suicide provision. The suicide provision was not directed against development of suicidal tendency which might constitute ground for action to avoid or reduce liability. Ft was directed against suicide, which is death by voluntary act. It was directed against suicide occurring within two years from date of policy, and the incontestable provision could not by any possibility apply to suicide occurring more than one year and less than two years from date of policy. There is no basis for distinguishing between suicide occurring eleven months and suicide occurring twenty-three months from date of policy, and the result is the two provisions relate to different grounds of contest.


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