INCONTESTABLE CLAUSE   223

service in time of war." In certiorari proceedings to review this refusal, the Appellate Division found the conflict between rider and statute to be unreal, and reversed the determination.

The Insurance Law of this state prescribes certain terms which must be embodied in every policy of life insurance, but does not otherwise limit the terms .of the policy or of any rider to be attached to it except by the exaction that policy and rider shall be approved by the superintendent of insurance. Insurance Law, § 101. The purpose of such approval is to avoid the risk of a departure from the terms of the statute with its enumerated restrictions. Hopkins v. Connecticut General Life Ins. Co., 225 N. Y. 76, 121 N. E. 465. If approval is omitted, the policy or the rider is not invalid ipso facto, unless in conflict with the provisions exacted by the statute. It is invalid even then to the extent of the conflict, and no farther. Insurance Law, § 101, last paragraph; Hopkins v. Connecticut General Life Ins. Co., supra, page 82 of 225 N. Y., 121 N. E. 465. The statute reads itself into the contract, and displaces inconsistent terms.

We agree with the Appellate Division in its holding that rider and statute in this instance are consistent and harmonious. The provision that a policy shall be incontestable after it has been in force during the lifetime of the insured for a period of two years is not a mandate as to coverage, a definition of the hazards to be borne by the insurer. It means only this, that within the limits of the coverage the policy shall stand, unaffected by any defense that it was invalid in its inception, or thereafter became invalid by reason of a condition broken. Like questions have arisen in other jurisdictions and in other courts of this state. There has been general concurrence with reference to the answer. * * *

The meaning of the statute in that regard is not changed by its exceptions. A contest is prohibited in respect of the validity of a policy, "except for nonpayment of premiums and except for violation of the conditions of the policy relating to military or naval service in time of war." Section 101, subd. 2. Here again we must distinguish between a denial of coverage and a defense of invalidity. Provisions are not unusual that an insured entering the military or naval service shall forfeit his insurance. A condition of that order is more than a limitation of the risk. In the event of violation, the policy, at the election of the insurer, is avoided altogether, and this though the death is unrelated to the breach. No such result follows where there is a mere restriction as to coverage. The policy is still valid in respect of risks assumed.

Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 254 U. S. 96, 41 S. Ct. 47, 65 L. Ed. 155 (1920), is not a decision to the contrary. The clause there in question was not a limitation as to coverage. It was a provision for a forfeiture. In case of the suicide of the insured, whether sane or insane, the policy was to be "void." This