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IMPOSSIBILITY

 

NEW ENGLAND MITT. LIFE INS. CO. v. REYNOLDS.

Supreme Court of -Alabama, 1928.
217 Ala. 307, 116 So. 131, 39 A. L. R. 1075.

Action by Leona Reynolds against the New England Mutual Life Insurance Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Reversed and remanded. * *

The evidence for plaintiff sustained the averment of the replication to the effect that before the lapse of the policy the insured became a non compos mentis, without physical or mental capacity to transact business, and so continued until his death some 13 months after the policy lapsed.

There was no evidence of proof of disability or notice thereof to the insurer at any time before the death of the insured. There was evidence that plaintiff, the beneficiary of the policy, had no knowledge of the existence of the policy or its conditions until after the death of the insured. * * *

BouLDIN, J. (1) We are of opinion that furnishing proof of disability to the insurer is made a condition precedent to the waiver of premium payments under the supplemental agreement set out in the special plea above. This agreement declares:

"If the insured * * * shall furnish due proof to the company, at its home office in the city of Boston, that he has become wholly disabled by bodily injury or disease, * * * the company will waive payment of each premium as it thereafter becomes due during the continuance of such disability."

The intervening clauses name the conditions under which such proof is allowable, and define the character of disability. They must all concur to make the waiver effective. But the furnishing of proof is the specific condition upon which the company "will" waive each premium "thereafter" to become due.

"Thereafter" clearly refers to date of furnishing proof. The clause is in no way ambiguous or of doubtful meaning. The pre-ceding paragraph recites the consideration upon which the insurer agrees to the "following waiver." A later clause provides that the insurer may, after acceptance of such proof as satisfactory, have a medical examination made, and if it appears the insured is able to perform work or engage in any occupation for compensation or profit, no further premiums will be waived.

The entire structure of the agreement negatives the idea of a self-operating waiver in the event of total disability, but imposes a contractual obligation on the company to waive premiums when "due proof" is furnished. Manifest reasons appear for thus limiting the agreement. The premium named in a policy of life insurance is the consideration for the contract. Its prompt payment is the life of the business. By the contract the renewal premium


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