462   MATURITY OF THE POLICY

Mutual Insurance Co. v. Armstrong, 117 U. S. 59. Granting the inherent wrongfulness of suicide—which is matter for the moralist rather than the judge—this doctrine fails when applied tl►ereto. No one can in this world derive a benefit from his own death. By that final event all earthly profit ends for him to whom it comes. He is for this life equally beyond gain and loss and, as to him, the rules that govern mundane intercourse become no longer applicable. Those who derive the benefit will have done no wrong. But it is said that suicide is a fraud on the insurer. To procure insurance with intent to commit suicide is a fraud on the insurer that should defeat recovery at the option of the insurer; and, with all the incidents of a rescission, will avoid the contract, even as against beneficiaries or assignees. Smith v. National Benefit Society, 123 N. Y. S5. But to argue that suicide, not previously in-tended, is such a fraud as to defeat recovery is to beg the very question of what is the contract; and the argument assumes that insurance rates are fixed upon a basis excluding death by suicide, while, as we have seen, the contrary must be the case, for the experience tables include all forms of death. Moreover, it would be next to impossible to fasten the fraudulent intent. The motives for suicide are difficult to fathom, and are usually complex. In the case in hand Dr. Campbell doubtless took his life through overwhelming chagrin due to arrest on a criminal charge. It is highly improbable that he thought at all of his insurance. To submit to a jury in each case the intent of the act would be practically fruitless. A general imperative rule in all cases must be established, and such seems to be the view of Justice Harlan, for he says that intentional self-destruction, with whatever motive, is impliedly excepted from the contract.

As a mere matter of construction it is of no importance what rule is to govern future contracts; but, in view of the historical aspect of the subject, the reading into contracts of life insurance this unexpressed exception will be sure to work great hardship. Many policies are being carried by creditors, or others interested. without a formal assignment, or the possibility of compelling one, except by consent of the insurer. These persons have rightly felt secure against recklessness or malignity extending even to suicide. and their investments should not be imperiled.

Lastly to be considered is the proposition that intentional suicide, when in sound mind, is not a risk which can legally be covered by insurance. This rests upon a postulated public policy. Justice Harlan says: "A contract, the tendency of which is to en-danger the public interests, or injuriously affect the public good, or which is subversive of sound morality, ought never to receive the sanction of a court of justice or be made the foundation of its judgment. If, therefore, a policy (taken out by a person whose life