472   MATURITY OF THE POLICY

determine the effect of any supposed language until an actual case is presented for decision.

Our attention has been called, since the argument, to the unreported case of Chapman v. The Republic Life Insurance Company of Chicago, decided in the Circuit Court of the United States for the northern district of Illinois. In that case the assured shot himself, and the policy contained a proviso exempting the insurance company from liability in case the death of the assured was caused "by his own act and intention." To give effect to his proviso, it seems to me too clear for reasonable dispute that the assured must have caused his death by his own act and intention, that is, by his intentional act; and that the self-destruction of the assured when he was incapable of forming any intention would be without the proviso; and yet it was held in that case that the self-destruction of the assured while he was unconscious of his act, and incapable of forming any intention, exempted the company from liability. That decision should certainly receive no countenance as authority, and I believe it has no support anywhere, except in the court in which it was rendered.

The judgment should therefore be affirmed, with costs.

For reversal: LOTT, Ch. C., REYNOLDS and GRAY, CC., for affirmance: EARL and DwIGHT, CC.

Judgment reversed.'

PARKER v. NEW YORK LIFE INS. CO.

Supreme Court of North Carolina, 1924.
188 N. Car. 403, 125 S. E. 6, 39 A. L. R. 1085.

CLARKSON, J. The action involves collection of $1,000 life insurance policy on the life of Roger L. Parker, husband of the plain-tiff, who died January 29, 1923, within a year from the issuance of said policy. The defendant denied liability, and in defense set up a provision contained in the policy which reads as follows:

"Self-destruction: In the event of self-destruction during the first two insurance years, whether the insured be sane or insane, the

s Accord: Bigelow v. Berkshire Life Ins. Co. (1876) 93 U. S. 284, 23 L. ed. 918. Many other cases in accord are discussed in 35 A. L. R. 160.

Contra: Inter-Southern Life Ins. Co. v. Boyd (1910, Ky.) 124 S. W. 333, Comment (1910) 8 Mich. L. Rev. 509; New York Life Ins. Co. v. Dean (1928) 226 Ky. 597, 11 S. W. (2d) 417, Comment (1929) 17 Ky. L. J. 404; Modern Woodmen v. Neeley (1908) 33 Ky. L. 758, 111 S. W. 282, Comment (1908) 8 Colum. L. Rev. 587; Columbian Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. Wood (1922) 193 Ky. 395, 236 S. W. 562, Comments (1922) 6 Minn. L. Rev. 414, (1922) 31 Yale L. J. 785; Fraternal Relief Assn. v. Edwards (1911) 9 Ga. App. 43, 70 S. E. 265, Comment (1911) 9 Mich. L. Rev. 729. Compare Supreme Lodge Mut. Protection v. Gelbke (1902) 198 IIl. 365, 64 N. E. 1058.

See also the comment (1895) 9 Harv. L. Rev. 156.

What is the difference between accidental self-destruction and suicide (e.g. the