476   MATURITY OF THE POLICY

as we have here, it is logically impossible to do anything but sustain it unless the evidence does preclude every reasonable hypothesis of natural or accidental death. For the reasons indicated, we feel that the hypothesis of accidental death is not precluded. * * *

Order affirmed.1O

(e) DEATH OF INSURED BY LEGAL EXECUTION.

SMITH v. METROPOLITAN LIFE INS. CO.
Supreme Court of New York, 1925. 125 Misc. 678, 211 N. Y. S. 755.

Action by Elizabeth Smith, as executrix of the last will and testament of Key Pendleton Smith, deceased, against the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company. From a judgment dismissing complaint (122 Misc. Rep. 136, 203 N. Y. S. 173), plaintiff appeals. Affirmed. * * *

10 See comment on this case (1928) 13 Minn. L. Rev. 69.

Accord: Michel v. London &c. Indemnity Co. (1926) 162 La. 160, 110 So. 186; International Life Ins. Co. v. Carroll (1927) 17 Fed. (2d) 42, 50 A. L. R. 362; Neasham v. New York Life Ins. Co. (1917) 244 Fed. 556, Comment (1918) 2 Minn. L. Rev. 395, (reversed on another point (1918) 250 Fed. 787) where the facts, though pointing strongly toward suicide, were held sufficient to sustain a judgment against the insurance company, the court saying (p. 561) : "Primarily, the presumption is against self-destruction, and it is one of the strongest presumptions with which courts have to deal. Being, as it is, entirely opposed to natural instinct to deliberately take one's own life, the fact will never be inferred unless the evidence is such as to fairly exclude every other reasonable hypothesis as to the cause of death. Of course, the presumption will not prevail against clear and definite proof; but if the circumstances are consistent with any other reasonable theory, the latter must be adopted to the exclusion of that of suicide."

Where the insured was shot in the mouth while in a locked hotel room subsequent to a drunk, there is sufficient evidence of suicide to prevent a recovery. Fidelity _Slut. Life Ins. Co. v. Wilson (1928) 175 Ark. 1094, 2 S. W. (2d) 80. In Aetna Ins. Co. v. Tooley (1926) 18 Fed. (2d) 243, a judgment for the beneficiary was reversed because the evidence was regarded as sufficient to establish suicide. See also Sovereign Camp, W. O. W. v. Haller (1900) 24 Ind. App. 108, 56 N. E. 255; Wilkinson v. National Life Assn. (1926) 203 Iowa 960, 211 N. W. 238, Comment (1927) 22 Ill. L. Rev. 324; New York Life Ins. Co. v. King (1922) 28 Ga. App. 607, 112 S. E. 383, Comment (1923) 23 Colum. L. Rev. 286; Life & Cas. Co. v. Andrews (1928, Miss.) 115 So. 548.

Some states have statutes depriving the insurer of the defense of suicide. See Carter v. Standard Ace. Ins. Co. (1925) 65 Utah 465, 238 Pac. 259, 41 A. L. R. 1495, for discussion of such a statute. See also (1909) Mo. Rev. Stat., § 6945, Comment (1915) 30 Harv. L. Rev. 189; Knights Templars &c. Life Indemnity Co. v. Jarman (1920) 104 Fed. 638. For other eases see 41 A. L. R. 1253. In Georgia a statute provides that the company shall not be liable in case of death of insured by suicide. Where the policy exempted from liability for suicide only for a year it was held the policy would control. Durden v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. (1911) 9 Ga. App. 797, 72 S. E. 295, Comment (1911) 10 Mich. L. Rev. 142. See also Sinnns, E. W., The Suicide Clause—Defense or Alternative Liability (1930) 16 Va. L. Rev. 343.

As to whether the suicide period runs after a reinstatement, see Business Men's Assur. Co. v. Scott (1927) 17 Fed. (2d) 4. See also comment (1915) Colum. L. Rev. 634.