480   MATURITY OF THE POLICY

There is also the provision in section 2301 of the Penal Law that "no forfeiture is imposed" for suicide. Notwithstanding the pro-visions of section 512 (then found in section 710 of Penal Code), recovery was refused. The opinion therein states (page 514 [22 N. E. 188]) that in fact there was no forfeiture. The party committing the crime had no absolute right to take under the law; that is, no right in the property, but only the right to take in the event that the testator died without changing his will or revoking it. By his wrongful act in killing the testator, the plaintiff had benefited himself by bringing into existence a right or interest in property which had not theretofore existed, and which never might have come into existence, had he not committed the crime. Under the circumstances the court held that the plaintiff could not enforce that right.

A similar situation seems to exist where an insured person either takes his own life or meets his death at the hands of justice, and the insurance is payable either to himself or his estate, or a third party who has no vested right to -it. In such a case, prior to the death of the insured, there is no one who has an absolute right to the proceeds of the policy. The right to recover is conditioned by a sound public policy upon the insured's not deliberately doing something which will make the policy mature. Therefore the act of the insured which accelerates its maturity, and thus benefits his estate or the beneficiary, should prevent recovery. Such holding does not work a forfeiture. It takes away no fixed right possessed by any one, but merely prevents those who represent the insured or take through him from getting a benefit from his wrongful act. * * *

Our conclusion is that, whether the insured commits suicide while sane or loses his life at the hands of justice. neither his estate nor a beneficiary having no vested interest may recover on the policy. The rule is otherwise if the policy be payable to a beneficiary who has a vested interest.

Tdgment affirmed, with $10 costs.

LAZANSIiY and MACCRATE, JJ., concur.13

13 See comments on this ease (1926) 11 Corn. L. Q. 390, 26 Colum. L. Rev. 108, 39 Harv. L. Rev. 394, (1924) 33 Yale L. J. 889 (on the case in the lower court).

Accord: Burt v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co. (1902) 187 U. S. 362, 47 L. ed. 216, 23 Sup. Ct. 139, Comments (1903) 16 Harv. L. R. 453, (1901) 14 Harv. L. Rev. 625 (on the case in the lower court), (1903) 3 Colum. L. Rev. 284. In this case the beneficiary alleged in her petition that notwithstanding the insured's conviction he did not in fact commit the crime. It was held that a demurrer to the petition was properly sustained. See also in accord Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. McCue (1911) 223 U. S. 234, 56 L. ed. 419, 32 Sup. Ct. 220, 38 L. R. A. (N. S.) 57, Comment (1912) 22 Yale L. J. 158, (1909) 7 Mich. L. Rev. 673 (on the case in the lower court) and cases in 36 A. L. R. 1255.

Suppose the insured after murdering the beneficiary and after his conviction, /hed died a natural death. Would the company have been liable?

A, policy provided that if the beneficiary predeceased the insured the proceeds of the policy would revert to the insured's estate. After murdering the beneficiary the insured made the policy payable to his heirs. The insured was afterwards