caused the death may have been an accidental result of the external cause, but that cause itself must have been, not only external and violent, but also accidental."
In that case, however, it is expressly conceded that the decision is not inconsistent with our decision in Healey v. Mutual Accident Ass'n, [133 Ill. 556, 25 N. E. 52], where the insured intentionally drank the substance but did not know that what he drank was a poison; or the case in which the insured ate oysters, exactly as he intended, but did not know they were unsound, (Maryland Casualty Co. v. Hudgins, 97 Tex. 124), or inhaled gas unintentionally. (Paul v. Travelers' Ins. Co. Supra.) The decision is, however, inconsistent with the Barry case, supra, where the insured did exactly what he intended to do in jumping from the platform, but in doing so some-thing unforeseen, unexpected and unusual occurred which produced the injury. In this case the deceased did exactly what he intended to do in drinking from the faucet, but he intended to drink the water furnished by the city and not the sewage-polluted water of Sugar Creek. It was the defect in the valve which was the accidental cause of his drinking the polluted water and taking into his stomach the bacilli which resulted in the typhoid fever and eventually in death. * * *
Typhoid fever is always a disease, but it does not follow, as is argued for the plaintiff in error, that the manner in which the disease is contracted is immaterial, or, as is assumed in the argument, that there was no bodily injury. Disease causes bodily injury when it prevents the organs of the body from performing their functions and finally produces death. An accident causing a disease which produces these results is the proximate cause of these results. Death from blood poisoning following an accident is the direct or proximate result of the accident. * * * Hydrophobia is a disease, but its common cause is the bite of an animal, which is an accident. * * *
In _Etna Life Ins. Co. v. Portland Gas Co., 229 Fed. 552, a suit was brought upon an employer's liability policy by which the insurance company agreed to indemnify the insured against damages on account of bodily injuries or death accidentally suffered by its employees. Certain employees of the assured in the course of their work contracted typhoid fever from the water furnished to them by the employer, on account of which the employer was compelled to pay damages to such employees. Action was brought to recover the amount of the damages which the employer was compelled to pay, and the only question presented for review was whether the harm done the workmen constituted a bodily injury accidentally received or suffered by them within the meaning of the policy. The argument was made, * * * that there was no accident but that in drinking the water the workmen were only satisfying an actual want, but it was held that there was an accident which oc-