policy, "against loss"—meaning, evidently, disability or death—"resulting from bodily injuries effected directly, exclusively and independently of all other causes through external, violent and accidental means," wherein the policy seems to deal with the cause of the accident rather than the cause of death in its requirement of exclusive and independent causation. Our judgment is that the policy requires that the accident shall be the efficient cause of the loss suffered, whether as disability or death; that is, the cause acting as the immediate agency in the production of the loss. To such a case the language of the Supreme Court of Arkansas in Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Meyer, 106 Ark. 91, 152 S. W. 995, 44 L. R. A. (N. S.) 493, may be aptly quoted:
"Where accidental injury aggravated a disease, and thereby hastened death so as to cause it to occur at an earlier period than it would have occurred but for the accident, it is the direct, independent, and exclusive cause of death at that time. But, on the other hand, if death resulted from the co-operation of a pre-existing disease and an accidental injury, and would not have occurred from the injury save with the co-operation of the disease" (as was probably the case here, though that was a question for the jury), "then it resulted in part, indirectly, from the disease, so as to exclude liability under a policy which embraced the last-stated clause (meaning the clause shown by some of the cases, in which the insurance did not cover `any death which resulted wholly or in part, directly or indirectly, from disease or bodily infirmity'). * * * The phrase, `resulting directly, independently and exclusively in death,' refers to the efficient, or, as some courts speak of it, the predominant, cause of death at the time it occurs. In other words, it means the proximate cause; whereas, the other phrase employed in some policies excepting liability where death has resulted, `wholly or in part, directly or indirectly, from disease or bodily infirmity,' refers to another contributing cause, whether proximate or remote." * * *
The judgment for plaintiff is affirmed.
GARDNER, MILLER and BOULDIN, JJ., concur.36
36 See comment on this case (1927) 25 Mich. L. Rev. 803. Accord: Kansas v. New York Life Ins. Co. (1923) 223 Mich. 238, 193 N. W. 867, Comment (1924) 22 Mich. L. Rev. 375 (pre-existing carbuncle contributed to death); United States Casualty Co. v. Thrush (1926) 21 Ohio App. 129, 152 N. E. 796, Comment (1927) 25 Mich. L. Rev. 467 (gangrene from a stubbed toe was contributed to by arterio-sclerosis); Fidelity &c. Co. v. Mitchel (P. C.)  3 A. C. 592, Comment (1918) 27 Yale L. J. 576 (permanent disability resulted from accident to wrist contributed to by latent tuberculosis) ; Fidelity &c. Co. v. Meyer (1912) 106 Ark. 91, 152 S. W. 995, 44 L. R. A. (N. S.) 493, Comment (1913) 11 Mich. L. Rev. 486 (accident aggravated pre-existing cancer).
For cases reaching a contrary result see the comments (1913) 61 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 338 and (1911) 9 Mich. L. Rev. 362.
SUBROGATION. A holder of an accident policy was injured by the negligence of a railroad company. He settled with the railroad company and then sued