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616   RIGHTS AND POWERS OF INSURER

squall coming on from the southeast, the ship was upset on her broad-side, and her masts lay on the water. Every endeavour was made to right her, but in vain. She afterwards sunk off Ryhope, drifted on shore, and became a total wreck. If the crew had not removed the ballast, the ship would most likely have stood the squall. * * * And his lordship left two questions to the jury: first, was it negligent conduct to throw the ballast overboard before arriving in harbour? secondly, did they think the piaster exercised a reasonable discretion in throwing overboard? They found, as to the first question, that they did think it negligent generally to throw over the ballast; secondly, that the master did right, sup-posing the practice itself authorized him. A verdict was thereupon entered for the defendant on the second issue, the learned Judge giving the plaintiff liberty to move to enter a verdict on that issue, if the Court should be of opinion that his construction of the meaning of the word "wilful," as used in the plea, was incorrect. * * *

PARKE, B. In this case the defendant, to a declaration upon a time policy for six months, stating a loss by perils of the seas, pleaded three pleas, on each of which issue was joined. On the first and third, the verdict was found for the plaintiff; on the second, for the defendant. This plea stated, "that, though the vessel was lost by perils of the sea, yet that such loss was occasioned wholly by the wilful, wrongful, negligent, and improper conduct of the master and mariners of the ship, by wilfully, wrongfully, negligently, and improperly throwing overboard so much of the ballast, that the vessel became unseaworthy, and was lost by perils of the sea, which otherwise she would have safely encountered and overcome." On a motion for judgment non obstante veredicto, it occurred to the Court to be questionable whether the plea was not at all events bad, inasmuch as the terms of it did not exclude the case of a loss by barratry, for which the underwriters would be clearly liable, and that on this declaration; and, as the fact certainly was, that the crew were not guilty of barratry it was very properly agreed that the plea should be amended by inserting the words, "but not barratrously," after the words, "negligently and improperly." And the plea, therefore, in its present shape, raises the question, whether the underwriters are liable for the wilful but not barratrous act of the master and crew, in rendering the vessel unseaworthy before the end of the voyage, by casting overboard a part of the ballast. The case was very fully and ably argued, during the course of the last and present term, before my Brothers Alderson, Gurney, _Mule, and myself. W'e have considered it, and we are of the opinion that the plea is bad in substance, and that the plaintiff is entitled to judgment, notwithstanding the verdict. The question depends altogether upon the nature of the implied warranty as to seaworthiness, or mode of navigation, between the assured and the underwriter, on a time policy. In the case of an


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