CREDITOR I\ DEBTOR'S PROPERTY   709

the complaint that the fire occurred on the 26th of November, 1922, and the summons was not served until October 24, 1924, nearly two years thereafter.

The trial court found that the plaintiffs were not subject to the one-year limitation prescribed by the standard policy, because they were not the assured, but appointees or transferees thereof, and the court found also that the plaintiffs had an insurable interest in the nature of some equitable lien for advances on goods to be manufactured, which were represented by what were called pro forma invoices. No actual invoices could be used, because no goods were manufactured, nor shipped, nor in existence at the time the invoices were sent to plaintiffs. * * *

[The court here held that an appointee could sue after the expiration of the one-year limitation.]

The plaintiff, however, has more difficulty with the question of his insurable interest. As to the nature of such interest, it was quite difficult, on the argument and from the evidence, to get any-thing but a vague insinuation as to what it is; but, as the varieties of insurable interest in the subject of a fire policy are limited, we can eliminate that which it is not, and therefore determine whether it comes within the accepted categories. An interest must be established ownership, possession, a lien, or such equitable interest as a stockholder has in corporate property.

Plaintiff owned no stock in the Nitro Powder Corporation, the insured, and therefore was not interested in that aspect. They had no possession nor right to possession of the property insured. There was no evidence of any pledge of the property as collateral for advances. There was no lien by way of chattel mortgage. The only testimony as to any interest that plaintiffs had is the testimony of a practice between the assured and the plaintiffs, which was described as the making out of pro forma invoices from time to time, to find the amount of money that the assured would look for from time to time, and that all the material of the insured on hand at the time of the fire was covered by such pro forma invoices. Certainly these pro forma invoices conveyed no title, nor were they intended to be documents affecting title. If they had any such effect, it would be to transfer title, and this would be to make then, in effect, bills of sale, and would vitiate the entire policy because of a change of ownership without the consent of the in. surer. These pro forma invoices were not produced, not accounted for, and no proof as to their substance was made, and therefore can support no finding of an interest in the property.

The evidence, however, shows that the property remained in the possession of the insured, and that the insured exercised all rights of ownership over it. It sold it in its own name, collected payments, and did not remit specific collections to plaintiffs, but on