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specific purpose of protecting our own corporations from unjust legislation in other States. To refuse to license this Company for the reasons claimed, at a time when we have no similar corporation in Ohio to protect, would in my judgment be a violation of the spirit of the law while engaged in a capricious effort to conform to its letter. I cannot, therefore, further entertain the protest.

"In support of the general conclusion here arrived at, I cite the case of The State ex rel. Insurance Companies v. Reinmund, in which our Supreme Court held that the Ohio Department could not make a charge for valuing policies of Massachusetts Companies, notwithstanding that the Massachusetts Department would demand a similar charge from the Union Central of Cincinnati should it enter that State. I cite further the case of State ex rel. Mississippi Valley Insurance Company v. Moore, S9 Ohio St. In this case there was an attempt to compel by mandamus the superintendent to i;sue a license to a company which had complied with all the forms of law governing the admission of Foreign Companies, but which the superintendent had reasons of his own to distrust. In refusing the writ the court says :

" The important business confided to the supervision of the defendant is too vast in its consequences to the people of our State to admit of a construction of his powers so narrow as to hold that his judgment or discretion are to take no part in determining his action upon the application of a Foreign Insurance Company for permission to transact its business within the State. His refusal in the case at bar was not a dereliction of duty. On the contrary, the highest consideration of public duty and official fidelity called upon him to see to it that the security of our people was not imperilled by his action. He was called to the exercise of official judgment and discretion. He exercised them, and as no fraud, bad faith or abuse of discretion intervened, so far as affects the present proceeding, his decision is final.'

"If a discretion as broad as this on the part of the Superintendent of Insurance is sustained by the Supreme Court, when exercised in refusing admission to a Company, certainly it would sustain him in the exercise of some little discretion in admittinq a company against which nothing is charged except that the state of its domicile would not admit a similar company from Ohio if there were any such."